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Abstract
Previous developmental studies have revealed variation in children’s abil-
ity to compute scalar inferences. While children have been shown to
struggle with standard scalar inferences (e.g., with scalar quantifiers like
“some”) (Noveck 2001, Chierchia et al. 2001, Papafragou and Musolino
2003, Guasti et al. 2005), there is also a growing handful of inferences
that children have been reported to derive quite readily (Papafragou and
Musolino 2003, Barner and Bachrach 2010, Stiller et al. 2015, Tieu et al.
2016, Singh et al. 2016, Hochstein et al. 2016, Tieu et al. 2017). One recent
approach, which we refer to as the Alternatives-based approach, attributes
the variability in children’s performance to limitations in how children
engage with the alternative sentences that are required to compute the
relevant inferences. Specifically, if the alternative sentences can be gener-
ated by simplifying the assertion, rather than by lexically replacing one
scalar term with another, children should be better able to compute the
inference. In this paper, we investigated this prediction by assessing how
children and adults interpret sentences that embed disjunction under a
universal quantifier, such as “Every elephant caught a big butterfly or
a small butterfly”. For adults, such sentences typically give rise to the
distributive inference that some elephant caught a big butterfly and some
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elephant caught a small butterfly (Gazdar 1979, Fox 2007, Crnicˇ et al.
2015). Another possible interpretation, though not one typically accessed
by adults, is the conjunctive inference that every elephant caught a big
butterfly and a small butterfly (Singh et al. 2016). Crucially, for our pur-
poses, it has been argued that both of these inferences can be derived using
alternatives that are generated by deleting parts of the asserted sentence,
rather than through lexical replacement, making these sentences an ideal
test case for evaluating the predictions of the Alternatives-based approach.
The findings of our experimental study revealed that children are indeed
able to successfully compute this class of inferences, providing support
for the Alternatives-based approach as a viable explanation of children’s
variable success in computing scalar inferences.
Keywords: implicatures, language acquisition, distributive inference, conjunc-
tive inference, pragmatics, disjunction, universal quantification
1 Introduction
According to the standard semantics of disjunction, which is derived from clas-
sical propositional logic, a basic disjunctive sentence like (1) is true if at least
one of its disjuncts is true. However, when a sentence like (1) is used in every-
day conversation, it often gives rise to the additional inferences in (2) and (3),
sometimes called scalar inferences.1 (Gazdar 1979, Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007,
among many others).
(1) The elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(2) The elephant didn’t catch both a big butterfly and a small butterfly.
(3) The speaker is ignorant as to whether the elephant caught a big butterfly
and as to whether the elephant caught a small butterfly.
The traditional Gricean explanation for how such inferences are derived involves
a combination of general reasoning and assumptions about how rational agents
interact in conversation (Grice 1975, Gamut 1991, among many others). More
specifically, the proposal is that the hearer assumes that at any given point
during a conversation, the speaker will produce the most informative utterance
that is relevant for the purposes of the conversation and that she believes to
be true. For example, when the speaker utters (1), the hearer will reason that
if the speaker could have uttered the more informative sentence (4), then she
would have done so. The fact that the speaker uttered (1), rather than (4),
leads the hearer to infer that the speaker does not have sufficient evidence that
(4) is true. If the hearer takes the speaker to be well-informed, then the hearer
is led to infer the negation of (4), which is the exclusivity inference (2).
(4) The elephant caught a big butterfly and a small butterfly.
1Also known as scalar implicatures.
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The question of how such inferences are derived has been subject to much
subsequent work since Grice and is the subject of ongoing debate. Approaches
differ in whether the source of the phenomenon lies within the grammar or in
a post-grammatical pragmatic domain. One aspect that most approaches agree
on is that the hearer’s reasoning about what the speaker might have said should
be constrained to a set of alternatives (Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979, Katzir 2007,
Fox and Katzir 2011). A standard idea in the literature is that at least some
of these alternative sentences are generated on the basis of certain words be-
ing associated with others in the language user’s mental lexicon. For example,
Horn (1972) suggests that certain words occupy positions on lexical scales. The
scales are ordered by informational strength (e.g., <or...and>, <some...all>,
<might...must>).2 When a speaker utters a sentence that includes one of the
terms on the scale, alternative sentences are generated by replacing the relevant
lexical item with one of its stronger scale-mates. For instance, the stronger
alternative to the speaker’s utterance (1) is sentence (4). The alternative sen-
tence, (4), is generated by replacing the lexical item ‘or’ in (1) with the stronger
scale-mate ‘and.’ Because the hearer supposes that the speaker is being co-
operative and has produced the strongest statement that she was prepared to
make, the hearer infers that sentence (1), with ‘or’, is the strongest statement
the speaker felt she had evidence for. Therefore, the hearer infers the negation
of the stronger alternative with ‘and.’ The negation of the alternative (4) yields
the exclusivity inference (2).3
The relationship between the exclusivity inference and the ignorance infer-
ence (3) is controversial (for discussion, see Sauerland 2004, Fox 2007, Meyer
2013). One approach invokes the same mechanism that underlies the derivation
of scalar inferences. On this approach, the ignorance inference (3) involves a
comparison of the speaker’s utterance (1) with the alternative sentences (5) and
(6). These alternatives correspond to the individual disjuncts of the sentence
in (1) (Gazdar 1979, Sauerland 2004).4 The alternative sentences (5) and (6)
are both more informative than the asserted sentence (1). If the speaker had
sufficient evidence that (5) and (6) were true, then she should have uttered these
alternatives instead of (1). The fact that the speaker chose not to say (5) or (6)
leads the hearer to infer that the speaker does not have sufficient evidence that
2The relative informativity of a lexical item on these scales is based on the entailment
relationship sentences containing them. Sentence A is more informative than sentence B iff A
asymmetrically entails B. For example, sentence (4) is more informative than (1) because (4)
entails (1), but sentence (1) does not entail (4).
3More recent work on alternatives criticises this approach for merely stipulating which
terms are associated with others in the lexicon, and argues instead for more general alternative-
generating algorithms for any given sentence. For discussion, see Katzir (2007), Fox and Katzir
(2011), Trinh and Haida (2015), and Breheny et al. (2016).
4On certain accounts, the individual disjuncts from which ignorance inferences arise do
not correspond to formal alternatives of a disjunctive sentence. Instead, they are simply more
informative relevant sentence meanings the speaker might have said instead. For our purposes,
it suffices that the ignorance inference can be derived without recourse to the lexical replace-
ment of alternatives; we make no claims about the (non-)formal status of the alternatives in
(5) and (6).
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(5) or (6) are true, generating the ignorance inference in (3).5
(5) The elephant caught a big butterfly.
(6) The elephant caught a small butterfly.
Note that there is no lexical replacement involved in generating the ignorance
inference, because the alternatives in (5) and (6) correspond to the individual
disjuncts of the asserted sentence (1) (Gazdar 1979, Sauerland 2004). That
is, these alternatives can be generated through a simplification of the asserted
sentence, specifically by deleting all but one of the disjuncts.
As we’ve now seen, the exclusivity and ignorance inferences can both be de-
rived through reasoning over alternative sentences that the speaker might have
uttered instead of what she actually said. Because of this, some accounts take
theses inferences to be derived in the same way (e.g., Sauerland 2004). However,
for reasons that we will discuss further, what is most relevant for our purposes
is the distinction in the alternatives that are generated for each inference; one
involves lexical replacement (i.e. the exclusivity inference), whereas the other in-
volves simplification of the original assertion (i.e. the ignorance inference). Here
and in the rest of the paper, we will refer to alternatives of the latter kind as
non-replacement alternatives. For discussion regarding the distinction between
alternatives generated by deletion versus alternatives generated by lexical re-
placement, see Katzir (2007) and Fox and Katzir (2011).
In addition to the substantial theoretical work on inferences like these, there
has also been a great deal of experimental work, including developmental studies
that assess children’s ability to compute such inferences. The bulk of this work
has reported that children consistently derive scalar inferences at lower rates
than adults do (Noveck 2001, Chierchia et al. 2001, Papafragou and Musolino
2003, Guasti et al. 2005, Foppolo et al. 2012, among many others). However,
this work has primarily focused on a rather restricted set of scalar inferences,
typically those derived on the basis of alternatives that are generated through
lexical replacement.
More recent investigations have expanded the range of inferences investigated
to plurality inferences, free choice inferences, ad hoc implicatures, conjunctive
inferences of disjunction, and ignorance inferences (Tieu et al. 2014, 2016, Stiller
et al. 2015, Hochstein et al. 2016, Singh et al. 2016, Tieu et al. 2017). Some
of these studies report low rates of inference derivation by children (Tieu et al.
2014), as in previous studies; however, others have reported adult-like rates of
inference derivation by children (Tieu et al. 2016, Hochstein et al. 2016, Singh
et al. 2016). Notably, the inferences that children have been reported to derive
readily are ones that involve non-replacement alternatives.
One attempt to explain children’s variable success in scalar inference com-
putation is the Alternatives-based approach (Reinhart 2006, Barner et al. 2011,
Tieu et al. 2016, Singh et al. 2016). On this approach, children’s difficulties
5Unlike in the case above of the exclusivity inference, in this case the hearer cannot
conclude that the speaker has evidence that (5) and (6) are false, as this would lead to a
contradiction with the assertion; see Sauerland (2004) and Fox (2007) for discussion.
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in deriving the bulk of previously investigated scalar inferences, and their ap-
parent success on a handful of other inferences, are explained by appealing to
children’s limitations in computing the relevant alternatives to the asserted sen-
tence. Furthermore, the Alternatives-based approach makes clear predictions
about children’s behaviour in dealing with inferences that have not been inves-
tigated previously.
The present paper investigates the predictions of the Alternatives-based ap-
proach by investigating children’s and adults’ interpretations of sentences in
which a disjunction is embedded under a universal quantifier, as in (7). Such
sentences constitute an ideal case study for testing the Alternatives-based ap-
proach, because two of the inferences that arise from such sentences are based
on non-replacement alternatives. Specifically, the sentence in (7) licenses the
distributive inference in (8) (Gazdar 1979, Crnicˇ et al. 2015). It has also been
proposed that children license the conjunctive inference in (9) (Fox 2007, Singh
et al. 2016).
(7) Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(8) Some elephant caught a big butterfly and some elephant caught a small
butterfly.
(9) Every elephant caught both a big butterfly and a small butterfly.
The derivation of the distributive inference in (8) involves the alternatives in
(10) and (11), which are non-replacement alternatives as they can be generated
by simplifying the asserted sentence in (7). As we will see, the findings of our
experimental study reveal that children are adult-like in deriving such inferences.
On the Alternatives-based approach, this finding is attributed to the fact that
the relevant alternatives (i.e. (10) and (11)) are derived through simplification
rather than lexical replacement.6
(10) Every elephant caught a big butterfly.
(11) Every elephant caught a small butterfly.
Moreover, we also found that a few children in our experiment computed
the conjunctive inference in (9), as reported in previous developmental studies
of children’s interpretation of disjunction (Singh et al. 2016 for disjunction em-
bedded under “every”; Paris 1973, Braine and Rumain 1981, Chierchia et al.
2004, Tieu et al. 2017 for unembedded disjunction).
To preview, we will conclude that the results of the present investigation
are in line with the predictions of the Alternatives-based approach, providing
further support for it as a viable explanation of children’s variable success in
computing a large class of scalar inferences.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we review previous
developmental studies of scalar inferences. We then outline a prediction of
6The conjunctive inference is derived from slightly different alternatives; however, the al-
ternatives are also generated through simplification of the disjunctive sentence. See Appendix
C for details.
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the Alternatives-based approach, and present an experiment designed to test
the prediction. We conclude with a discussion of how our results bear on the
Alternatives-based approach.
1.1 Children’s variable performance on scalar inferences
Children have been found to display variable success on scalar inferences. We
will first consider some studies that have reported non-adult-like performance,
and then move on to cases in which children were adult-like.
1.1.1 Non-adult-like behaviour
For over a decade, developmental research has found that children derive scalar
inferences far less often than adults do (e.g., Noveck 2001, Chierchia et al.
2001, Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Guasti et al. 2005, Foppolo et al. 2012,
among many others). For example, Noveck (2001) presented underinformative
sentences like (12) to a group of 8-year-old children, 10-year-old children, and
adults. The participants were asked if they agreed with the sentences. Partic-
ipants who derived the scalar inference in (13) were expected to disagree with
the sentence.
(12) Some giraffes have long necks.
(13) Not all giraffes have long necks.
Noveck reported that child participants rejected the underinformative state-
ments far less often than the adult participants did. This pattern of responses
was taken as evidence that children derived fewer inferences than adults did.
This result is representative of much of the subsequent work investigating chil-
dren’s performance on scalar inferences (though see Katsos and Bishop 2011
for evidence that features of the task, such as the number of response options
provided to children, can influence their performance). It is worth noting, how-
ever, that many of the previous developmental studies have focused on a fairly
restricted set of scalar inferences, namely those involving the scalar quantifiers
‘some’/‘all’, the logical connectives ‘or’/‘and’, and the modals ‘may’/‘must’.
Importantly, the derivation of such scalar inferences involves alternatives gener-
ated through lexical replacement. More recent work has turned to investigating
other inferences, including those derived from non-replacement alternatives.
1.1.2 Adult-like behaviour
In the recent formal semantics/pragmatics literature, a wide range of inferences
have received a scalar inference-based analysis (Levinson 2000, Spector 2007,
Fox 2007, Klinedinst 2007, Thomas 2012, Romoli 2013, Chierchia 2013). Sub-
sequent studies investigating children’s knowledge of these diverse inferences
have produced some surprising results (Zhou et al. 2013, Tieu et al. 2014, 2016,
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Hochstein et al. 2016, Bill et al. 2016, Singh et al. 2016, Tieu et al. 2017), in-
cluding the finding that some of these inferences are derived quite readily by
young children.
One example of an inference that children have been reported to compute at
adult-like rates is the free choice inference, investigated by Tieu et al. (2016).
Tieu et al. investigated Mandarin-speaking 4-year-old children’s interpretation
of disjunction under deontic modals, as well as English-speaking 5-year-old chil-
dren’s interpretation of free choice ‘any’ under deontic modals. Both sentence
types give rise to free choice inferences, which have received a scalar inference
analysis in the literature (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Alonso-Ovalle 2005,
Fox 2007, Klinedinst 2007, Chemla 2009).7 For example, a sentence like (14)
gives rise to the free choice inference in (15).
(14) The elephant is allowed to catch a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(15) The elephant is allowed to catch a big butterfly and the elephant is
allowed to catch a small butterfly.
Tieu et al. (2016)’s results provided some preliminary evidence in support
of the proposal that children are capable of computing inferences that can be
generated using non-replacement alternatives, as compared to ones that require
lexical replacement of alternatives. Tieu et al. used a Truth Value Judgment
Task (Crain and Thornton 1998), in which the child participants were presented
with free choice sentences (e.g., (14)), in contexts that were inconsistent with
the free choice inference (e.g., (15)). That is, in the context, the character men-
tioned in the target sentence (e.g., the elephant) was only permitted to perform
one of the mentioned actions (e.g., catch a big butterfly). The study compared
children’s performance with free choice inferences and standard scalar inferences
involving plain disjunctions (i.e. the exclusivity inference). Tieu et al. found
that the Mandarin-speaking children derived the exclusivity inference from test
sentences with plain disjunction at a typically low rate (18%), whereas they de-
rived free choice inferences from sentences that contained a deontic modal verb
at a significantly higher rate (91%). Notably, both the free choice inference
and the exclusivity inference conditions were tested within subjects, using the
same Truth Value Judgment Task and similar materials, suggesting the diver-
gent performance on the two inferences cannot be explained by differences in
methodology.8
As another example, children have been reported to interpret numeral terms
as exact (Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Barner and Bachrach 2010, Huang
et al. 2013). On certain accounts, such an interpretation involves the derivation
of a scalar inference (Horn 1972, Levinson 2000); for instance, ‘two’ is interpreted
as ‘exactly two’ through the negation of the stronger alternatives ‘three’, ‘four’,
etc.
7See Zimmermann (2000), Geurts (2005) and Barker (2010) for alternative analyses.
8Tieu et al. (2016) report similarly high rates of free choice inferences from free choice
English ‘any’, and Huang and Crain (2014) report similar rates of free choice inferences for
Mandarin renhe ‘any’.
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Turning to ad-hoc inferences, Stiller et al. (2015) presented 2- to 4-year-old
children with sentence descriptions (e.g., My friend has glasses) and three cor-
responding pictures. The participants’ task was to identify which of three faces
the sentence was describing. The three faces created an ad-hoc scale (i.e <face
with no glasses, face with glasses, face with glasses and hat>). If participants
derived the relevant ad-hoc inference for the target sentence description (i.e my
friend does not have a hat), they were expected to select the face with glasses
and no hat. Stiller et al. reported that 3-year-old children and 4-year-old chil-
dren derived ad-hoc inferences approximately 75% of the time.
In yet another example of children’s relative success, Hochstein et al. (2016)
investigated 4- to 5-year-old children’s derivation of ignorance inferences. These
authors reported that 5-year-old children derived ignorance inferences at a rate
of 70%, while they computed exclusivity inferences only 30-40% of the time.
Finally, children have also been reported to succeed in accessing exhaus-
tive interpretations similar to those in the derivation of scalar implicatures,
when interpreting ‘only’-sentences involving context-dependent scales (Barner
et al. 2011). Barner et al. (2011) presented 4-year-old children with pictures
depicting three objects/animals (e.g., cat, cow, dog), all of which were doing
the same activity (e.g., sleeping). Children were asked one of two questions;
Are only some of the animals sleeping? or Are only the cat and the cow sleep-
ing?. The former question is associated with context-independent alternatives,
<some...all>, whereas the latter is associated with context-dependent alterna-
tives, <cat, cow, dog>). A negative answer to these questions was taken as
evidence of an exhaustive interpretation, i.e. Only some, not all, of the animals
are sleeping. Barner et al. reported that children accessed the exhaustive inter-
pretation in the context-independent condition 33% of the time, whereas they
did so in the context-dependent condition 86% of the time.
1.1.3 Explaining children’s variable behaviour
The majority of previous studies investigating children’s abilities with scalar
inferences and exhaustive interpretations have reported low rates of derivation in
children. However, some recent studies have revealed a series of inferences that
children successfully compute. This disparity in findings calls for an explanation
for children’s variable success. The need for an explanation is especially pressing
on unified accounts that treat all of the relevant inferences in the same way.
Two main kinds of explanations for the developmental findings have been
proposed. On one account, children’s difficulties with scalar inferences are at-
tributed to limitations in their pragmatic knowledge (Noveck 2001, Katsos and
Bishop 2011, Skordos and Papafragou 2016). This line is taken, for example, by
Katsos and Bishop (2011), who propose that children are more ‘pragmatically
tolerant’ than adults. On this view, even when children derive scalar inferences,
they are nevertheless more likely than adults to accept a target sentence, de-
spite the fact that the inference makes the sentence false. Similarly, Skordos
and Papafragou (2016) propose that children have a limited understanding of
which alternative sentences are relevant in a given context (see Noveck 2001
8
for a similar idea). This limitation is expected to affect children’s derivation of
scalar inferences, since alternative sentences need to be perceived as ‘relevant’
before they can be negated.
Such pragmatic explanations are able to account for the typical observation
of low rates of scalar inferences in children. However, it is unclear how such
accounts can be extended to cases where children perform at adult-like rates in
deriving inferences (e.g., free choice inferences). One would expect the proposed
limitation ascribed to children (pragmatic tolerance or limited understanding of
relevance) to have a uniform effect across different types of inferences, contra
recent findings.
A second kind of explanation that attempts to account for children’s selective
success on scalar inferences is one we will broadly term the Alternatives-based
approach. This approach attributes children’s difficulties to a limitation in chil-
dren’s ability to generate alternatives. There are different proposals regarding
the cause of this difficulty. Some explanations appeal to children’s processing
limitations, suggesting that the process of generating alternatives is costly, and
therefore challenging for children (Chierchia et al. 2001, Gualmini et al. 2001,
Reinhart 2006, Tieu et al. 2016). Others appeal to limitations in children’s
knowledge of lexical scales, suggesting that children often have not learned the
scales required to generate alternatives through lexical replacement (Barner and
Bachrach 2010, Barner et al. 2011). This difficulty with generating alternatives
means that children will experience difficulties deriving the associated scalar
inferences. In this way, the Alternatives-based approach, like the pragmatic-
based explanations, can account for why children have been found to struggle
with many scalar inferences.
In contrast to the pragmatic-based explanations, however, the Alternatives-
based approach can also account for why children have been found to succeed
on certain scalar inferences. Crucially, nearly all of the inferences that children
have been found to compute successfully do not involve alternatives generated
through lexical replacement. Instead, they involve non-replacement alterna-
tives. That is, they involve alternatives generated through the simplification
of the asserted sentence (or, in the case of ad hoc implicatures, through al-
ternatives that are made salient and easily retrievable from the context). For
example, as already mentioned, a sentence like (14) (repeated in (16)) is often
associated with the free choice inference in (15) (repeated in (17)). Deriving free
choice inferences as scalar inferences involves the alternative sentences in (18)
and (19). However, these are non-replacement alternative sentences as they are
generated by deleting parts of the assertion in (16), and not by lexical replace-
ment of scalar terms (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Alonso-Ovalle 2005, Fox
2007, Klinedinst 2007, Chemla 2009). As mentioned, Tieu et al. (2016) found
that children readily derived the free choice inferences associated with these
kinds of alternatives.
(16) The elephant is allowed to catch a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(17) The elephant is allowed to catch a big butterfly and the elephant is
allowed to catch a small butterfly.
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(18) The elephant is allowed to catch a big butterfly.
(19) The elephant is allowed to catch a small butterfly.
If we assume that, aside from the proposed limitation associated with the
lexical replacement of alternatives, children are in all other relevant respects
adult-like, then at least some version(s) of the Alternatives-based approach will
predict children to readily derive scalar inferences like (17). For example, chil-
dren’s limited knowledge of lexical scales, as proposed by Barner and Bachrach
(2010), will not affect their ability to compute scalar inferences that do not in-
volve knowledge of lexical scales, namely those derived from non-replacement
alternatives.
The predictions of proposals attributing children’s difficulties to process-
ing limitations (e.g., Reinhart 2006), are somewhat less clear (see Singh et al.
2016, footnote 32, for some considerations that may speak against a processing-
based account). Such proposals could in fact be taken to predict that children’s
behaviour across all scalar implicatures should be uniform, assuming all impli-
catures are highly demanding in terms of processing resources. On the other
hand, if we assume that alternatives derived through lexical replacement are
more costly than alternatives generated through some other source (e.g., by
simplifying the assertion), then these processing accounts will also predict that
children should be more successful at deriving scalar inferences associated with
non-replacement alternatives (see Chemla and Bott 2014). In any case, in the
remainder of this paper, when we refer to the ‘Alternatives-based approach’, we
are only referring to explanations that predict that children will more readily
derive scalar inferences from non-replacement alternatives.
The next section illustrates how the predictions of the Alternatives-based
approach can be tested further by focusing on other inferences derived from non-
replacement alternatives. Specifically, we will focus on testing the predictions
of the Alternatives-based approach for sentences containing disjunction under a
universal quantifier.
1.2 Testing the Alternatives-based approach
As noted earlier, a sentence like (20) is associated with the distributive inference
in (21) and the conjunctive inference in (22). Crucially, as outlined in Appendix
B and C, the alternatives that are required to compute these inferences are not
generated through lexical replacement.9 Rather, the relevant alternatives in
(23) and (24) are non-replacement alternatives that can be generated by deleting
parts of the asserted sentence in (20).10
9Note that Crnicˇ et al. (2015) argue against deriving the distributive inference through a
traditional scalar inference process. For our purposes, what matters is that the process they
argue for is the same with respect to the nature of the alternative sentences. The Alterna-
tives-based approach therefore makes the same predictions regarding children’s behaviour.
10Note that the derivation of the conjunctive inference from an assertion like (20) is only
possible on certain theories of scalar implicature computation, namely theories that allow
the latter to be embeddable (e.g., Fox 2007); see Appendix C for details and an example of
derivation.
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(20) Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(21) Some elephant caught a big butterfly and some elephant caught a small
butterfly.
(22) Every elephant caught both a big butterfly and a small butterfly.
(23) Every elephant caught a big butterfly.
(24) Every elephant caught a small butterfly.
The Alternatives-based approach, therefore, predicts that children should
readily compute distributive inferences like (21) and conjunctive inferences like
(22), in response to sentences like (20), since both kinds of inferences are derived
through non-replacement alternatives.1112
Our predictions for adults, on the other hand, are different. While adults are
expected to derive the distributive inference, they are not expected to derive the
conjunctive inference. This is because adults, unlike children, can presumably
generate the alternative involving lexical replacement (i.e. the alternative in
which disjunction is replaced by conjunction), which is thought to ‘block’ the
derivation of the conjunctive inference (see Fox 2007, Singh et al. 2016, and
Tieu et al. 2017 for relevant discussion).
In sum, we are assuming that the distributive inference and the conjunc-
tive inference are members of a natural class of scalar inferences, namely, in-
ferences derived through non-replacement alternatives (Katzir 2007, Fox and
Katzir 2011). Notably, for a sentence like (20), the distributive and the conjunc-
tive inferences are the only inferences that can be derived via non-replacement
alternatives (see Appendix D for details). Importantly for our purposes, the
Alternatives-based approach predicts that children should be able to derive both
kinds of inferences, since no lexical replacement is required. Since we do not
expect adults to compute conjunctive inferences, we cannot expect that the two
inferences will be computed at exactly the same rates in children and adults.
However, the Alternatives-based approach does predict that children should
compute this class of inferences (i.e. either the distributive or the conjunctive
inference) at a similar rate to adults.13 This prediction was investigated in the
present experimental study by assessing the rates at which adults and children
derive distributive and conjunctive inferences from sentences like (20).
11As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the assumption that conjunctive inferences
are a genuine possibility derived through non-replacement alternatives, as opposed to arising
due to some general confusion on the part of children, is predicated on the proposal in Singh
et al. (2016), who provide supporting evidence that children indeed access such conjunctive
inferences.
12Note also that the conjunctive inference asymmetrically entails the distributive inference.
This makes it difficult to determine whether or not the child participants derive both inferences
simultaneously. We will return to this issue.
13Notice that this picture diverges from a more classic view on which children only access
the ‘basic’, unenriched meaning of sentences like (20) (e.g., Noveck 2001). In the present case,
the Alternatives-based approach actually predicts that not only will children derive the same
inference as adults (i.e. the distributive inference), they may also derive inferences that adults
do not (i.e. the conjunctive inference).
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2 Experiment
The present experiment was devised to determine the extent to which children
derive distributive and/or conjunctive inferences from sentences in which dis-
junction is embedded under the universal quantifier. Both of these inferences
rely on non-replacement alternatives. Therefore, the experimental hypothesis,
based on the Alternatives-based approach, was that the child participants would
compute such inferences at adult-like rates. This finding would be in contrast
to the findings of much previous research on inferences that require lexical re-
placement of scalar terms. In these studies, the child participants were found
to derive inferences at significantly lower rates than adult participants.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Seventeen monolingual English-speaking adults (Macquarie University under-
graduate students, all females) and 20 monolingual English-speaking children
(4;01-5;08, M=4;05, 5 females, 15 males) participated in the experiment. The
child participants had no history of language impairment or delay. The adults
took part in the experiment for course credit, or for a payment of 15AUD. Chil-
dren were recruited from several on-campus daycares at Macquarie University,
and from a Macquarie University child research participant database. Informed
consent was obtained from the adult participants, and from the parent/guardian
of the child participants.
2.1.2 Procedure
The experiment used a version of the Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT)
(Crain and Thornton 1998). Participants listened to a series of short stories, il-
lustrated with photographs of toy props, on a laptop computer. After each story,
a puppet appeared on the computer screen to utter the target sentence. Partic-
ipants were asked to judge whether the puppet’s sentence was right or wrong.
If the participant said that the puppet was wrong, they were asked to pro-
vide a justification (“Why?” or “What really happened in the story?”). Some
children also spontaneously provided follow-up justifications for yes-responses.
Adults were tested using the same materials, but were asked to provide written
responses, including written justifications for yes- and no-responses.
Each child was tested individually, either in the lab or in a quiet room at
their preschool. Adult participants were tested simultaneously in groups of
three. The two test conditions were conducted in two sessions, 7–9 days apart,
each lasting approximately 15 minutes. This was done to separate the distribu-
tive and non-distributive conditions, reducing the chance that participants’
responses in one condition might influence their responses in the other condi-
tion. The order in which the two sessions were presented was counterbalanced
across participants.
12
2.1.3 Materials
Each participant was presented with four target sentences in the Non-Dis-
tributive condition and four target sentences in the Distributive condition,
as well as two clearly true and two clearly false control sentences. The control
sentences included the universal quantifier every, without disjunction. In addi-
tion, four filler sentences were included, for a total of 12 trials. The sentences
were presented by the puppet using pre-recorded videos.
Test conditions
Each trial consisted of a single story. In each story, there were three characters
and two sets of objects. In each story, each of the characters considered the
two sets of objects in front of them; they then made a decision to perform a
pre-designated action on one of the two objects, and then proceeded to perform
that action. Once all the characters had completed the action, the experimenter
asked the puppet to describe what the characters had done in the story. The
puppet then responded with the target sentence. To illustrate a typical trial,
the target sentence (26) was associated with the story in (25).
(25) Example of Distributive target story
This is a story about three elephants. The elephants have come to a
park to catch butterflies. There are big butterflies and small butterflies.
The big butterflies are hard to catch, but the small butterflies are easy to
catch. Let’s see which butterflies the elephants decide to catch. The first
elephant says: “I am not very fast, so I will catch a small butterfly.”
So she catches a small butterfly. The second elephant says: “I am very
fast, so I will catch a big butterfly.” So he catches a big butterfly. The
third elephant says: “I am also very fast, so I will also catch a big but-
terfly.” So he catches a big butterfly. And here are the elephants, with
the butterflies that they caught [see Figure 1].
Experimenter: Now let’s see if <Puppet’s name> was paying atten-
tion. <Puppet’s name>, what did the elephants do?
(26) Puppet: Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
In the Distributive condition, participants who computed the literal mean-
ing of the sentences were expected to accept them, since every elephant caught
a big butterfly or a small butterfly. Participants who computed the distributive
inference were also expected to accept the test sentences, since at least one ele-
phant caught a big butterfly and at least one elephant caught a small butterfly.
However, participants who computed the conjunctive inference were expected
to reject the target sentences, since none of the elephants caught both a big
butterfly and a small butterfly.
In the Non-distributive condition, all of the characters acted upon the
same kind of object (e.g., all of the elephants caught a big butterfly). As in the
Distributive condition, participants who computed the literal meaning were
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Figure 1: Final picture associated with the story in (25). Each elephant is
holding the butterfly they caught.
expected to accept the target sentences. Participants who computed the con-
junctive inference were again expected to reject the target sentences, since none
of the elephants caught both a big butterfly and a small butterfly. Participants
who computed the distributive inference were also expected to reject the target
sentences, since none of the elephants caught a small butterfly. A summary of
the expected pattern of responses in the two conditions is presented in Table 1.
Note that, as outlined in Appendix D, these response patterns are not expected
on any other possible interpretations of our target sentences.
Distributive Non-Distributive
Literal interpretation accept accept
Distributive interpretation accept reject
Conjunctive interpretation reject reject
Table 1: Expected responses to the Distributive and Non-distributive tar-
get sentences according to the three possible interpretations.
Controls and fillers
In addition to the eight target sentences, participants also received four con-
trol trials involving sentences containing the universal quantifier every but no
disjunction. These control items were designed to ensure that participants un-
derstood the basic meaning of the universal quantifier. Participants received
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two clearly true and two clearly false controls. For example, on one false control
item, three horses have to decide which of two vehicles to drive, a car or a boat.
Two of the horses end up driving a boat, and one drives a car. The puppet then
utters the false target in (27).
(27) Every horse drove a boat.
In addition to the targets and controls, participants also received four filler
items, which could either be associated with a yes-response or a no-response.
The experimenter determined which judgment to elicit from the participant,
depending on the number of yes-responses and no-responses the participant
had produced on previous trials. In this way, the experimenter ensured that
each participant produced an equal number of yes-responses and no-responses.
2.2 Results
Participants had to correctly answer at least 75% of the filler trials and at least
75% of the control trials in order to be included in the analysis. All participants
passed this criterion, and no participants were excluded from the analysis.
The performance by child and adult participants in the target conditions is
presented in Figure 2, plotted as the proportion of target sentence rejections in
the Distributive and Non-Distributive conditions.
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Figure 2: Proportion of target sentence rejections by Group and Condition.
Each dot represents an individual participant’s mean rejection of target sen-
tences in that condition. A horizontal jitter of .1 and vertical jitter of .025 were
applied to the dots for easier visualisation.
The data were analysed using Generalized Mixed-Models (GLMER) in R
(version 3.3.3) with the LanguageR package (version 1.4.1). In the analysis, we
used a backward elimination procedure to compare the goodness-of-fit of the
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Predictor Est. SE Z Wald p
(Intercept) 10.74 2..29 4.70 <.001
Condition - Non-Distributive -20.02 3.11 -6.43 <.001
Summary of fixed effects in the logit model (N = 296; log-likelihood = -68.2).
Table 2: The best fitting model of the data. Adult and Distributive were
used as reference levels (0) for Group and Condition factors, respectively.
models. We started with the maximal structure that allowed the models to
converge, following the recommendation by Barr (2013). This maximal model
contained two random intercepts (for participants and for items) and an indi-
vidual adjustment of the condition for each participant (random slope). Group
(Adult vs. Child), Condition (Distributive vs. Non-Distributive), and the
interaction of Group-by-Condition were included as fixed effects. The refer-
ence categories in our analysis were ‘Adult’ for Group and ‘Distributive’ for
Condition.
We evaluated whether each of the predictors (i.e. fixed effects) significantly
contributed to the model’s fit by comparing a model including that predictor
against another that did not include it, using a χ-square test (Jaeger 2008).
Subsequently, we calculated the z -value, based on the Wald statistic, which
allows for an estimation of the statistical significance of each predictor included
in the model.
The fixed effect of Condition made a significant contribution to the fit of the
model (χ2(1) = 12.67, p < .001), whereas the interaction of the two fixed effects
(χ2(1) = .38, p = .54) and the fixed effect of Group (χ2(1) = .01, p = .91) did
not contribute significantly to the fit of the model.
Estimated coefficients, their standard errors, Z-values, and associated p-
values for the chosen model are reported in Table 2.
The results reveal that target sentences in the Non-Distributive condi-
tion were rejected at a significantly higher rate than target sentences in the
Distributive condition. No difference in target sentence rejection was found
between the two groups.
Based on the majority of judgments produced by each individual participant
in each condition, we categorised the participants into different responder types,
i.e. “Literal”, “Distributive”, and “Conjunctive”. A summary of the responder
types is presented in Table 3. For example, a participant was classified as
“Distributive” if they accepted at least three of four target sentences in the
Distributive condition and rejected at least three of four target sentences in
the Non-Distributive condition.
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Distributive Non-Distributive
Literal responder accept accept
Distributive responder accept reject
Conjunctive responder reject reject
Table 3: Expected response patterns for the Distributive and Non-
distributive targets, by category of responder.
Three children were excluded from the categorisation, as one gave mixed
responses, and two produced a pattern of responses that was not predicted by
any of the relevant interpretations. The remainder of the participants fell into
one of the three categories. Table 4 presents the number of participants in each
category.
Child Adult
Literal responders 7 7
Distributive responders 7 9
Conjunctive responders 3 1
Table 4: Distribution of responder types across the two groups.
Since our primary interest is in identifying whether children would derive an
inference from the target sentences (whether distributive or conjunctive), Table
5 collapses the Distributive and Conjunctive responders into a single category
of ‘Inference’ responders; these are participants who computed one inference or
the other.
Child Adult
Literal responders 7 7
Inference responders 10 10
Table 5: Distribution of responder types across the two groups, collapsing Dis-
tributive and Conjunctive responders.
As can be seen in Table 5, children and adults patterned identically in terms
of the distribution of literal responders and inference responders. Table 5 shows
that children were as likely as adults to compute literal meanings, and as likely
to compute inferences.
Justifications
In addition to yes-/no-responses, we also collected justifications from each par-
ticipant, which were generally consistent with their categorisation as a Literal,
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Distributive, or Conjunctive responder. For instance, the justifications from the
7 children and 7 adults who gave literal responses (accepting both the distribu-
tive and non-distributive targets) generally focused on repeating the basic
elements of the relevant story, e.g. (Yes) every girl ate a big or a small pizza;
(Yes) two dogs drove a big car and one dog drove a small car ; (Yes) every cow
washed a big dish.
The 7 children and 9 adults who were categorised as Distributive respon-
ders accepted the distributive targets. The adult participants justified their
yes-responses by recounting what had happened in the story, e.g. (Yes) every
elephant did catch either a big or small butterfly ; (Yes) two girls ate a big pizza
and one ate a small pizza. The Distributive responders also rejected the non-
distributive targets, justifying their no-responses by pointing out that all of
the characters had (only) acted on the one set of items, e.g. (No) all the fairies
ate a big cookie, (No) they all did wash a big dish.
Finally, the 3 children and 1 adult who were categorised as Conjunctive
responders rejected the Distributive targets, justifying their no-responses by
recounting what had happened in the story, e.g. (No) because the two girls said
the big pizza and one said the small one; (No) two have big teas, and one got
a little tea. The Conjunctive responders also rejected the Non-distributive
targets, explaining that the characters had only acted on one of the sets of items,
e.g., (No) everyone opened a big can. Her said everyone opened a big one and
a small one; (No) all of them drank the big ones.
In sum, participants’ justifications were generally consistent with the inter-
pretations attributed to them.
3 Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the predictions of the Alterna-
tives-based approach (Chierchia et al. 2001, Gualmini et al. 2001, Reinhart 2006,
Barner and Bachrach 2010, Barner et al. 2011, Tieu et al. 2016). Specifically, we
aimed to test the prediction that children would be able to compute inferences
that were derived from non-replacement alternatives, that is, from alternatives
that could be generated from the asserted sentences through deletion.
We did this by investigating adults’ and children’s interpretations of sen-
tences like (28). Specifically, we looked at whether their interpretations included
distributive inferences such as (29) (Crnicˇ et al. 2015) or conjunctive inferences
such as (30) (Singh et al. 2016), as both these inferences have been proposed to
be derived as scalar inferences from non-replacement alternatives. The Alterna-
tives-based approach would lead us to expect children to readily access (i.e. at
a similar rate as adults) an inference-based reading, be it from a distributive
inference or a conjunctive inference.
(28) Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(29) Some elephant caught a big butterfly and some elephant caught a small
butterfly.
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(30) Every elephant caught both a big butterfly and a small butterfly.
Our experimental results indicate that children indeed accessed inference-based
readings of the test sentences, and importantly, we did not find any difference
between the rates at which children and adults accessed these readings, in line
with the prediction of the Alternatives-based approach. Specifically, both groups
exhibited the same decrease in target sentence acceptance when the sentences
were used to describe contexts that were inconsistent with both the distributive
and conjunctive inferences. This indicates that children were deriving at least
one of the inferences of interest, as readily as adults did, consistent with the
predictions of the Alternatives-based approach.14
Children’s rejections in the Distributive condition, in which the target
sentences were presented in the contexts that were consistent with the distribu-
tive inference but not with the conjunctive inference, indicate that children were
indeed computing the conjunctive inference to some extent. The results sug-
gest that children’s rejections in the Non-Distributive condition were likely
driven by a mix of distributive and conjunctive inferences. This is because if
children were only deriving conjunctive inferences, we would not expect a dif-
ference in their behaviour between the two conditions (as both conditions were
incompatible with the conjunctive inference). The individual participant data
were also informative, indicating the presence of each of the relevant readings
(literal, distributive, and conjunctive). Importantly, we found no differences
in how children and adults were distributed across the Literal and Inference
categories. In sum, the results of our experiment are consistent with the pre-
diction of the Alternatives-based approach: when a scalar inference is derived
from non-replacement alternatives, children can derive it readily.
Focusing on the conjunctive inference, we observed evidence for this inference
in the responses of three children and one adult. The responses by the children
were consistent with those of children in previous studies by Singh et al. (2016)
and Tieu et al. (2017). However, the conjunctive inference was far less robust
in the present experiment, as compared to the findings reported in the previous
studies. It is worth noting in this regard that, although our experiment included
a condition that was consistent with the distributive inference, there was no
condition that was consistent with the conjunctive inference. If children derived
both inferences, they may have perceived the sentence to be ambiguous between
a distributive and a conjunctive interpretation. If so, then the fact that the
distributive inference was consistent with one of the experimental conditions
may have weighed in its favour, leading participants to resolve the ambiguity by
computing the distributive inference. A future study might include, in addition
to our conditions, a condition in which the conjunctive inference is made true.
14An anonymous reviewer points out that some of the adult and child rejections may arise
due to a pragmatic oddness (i.e. oddness due to something other than falsehood); for instance,
the reviewer observes that in the Non-Distributive condition, it is odd to utter “every Y is
A or B” when “every Y is A” would suffice. It is somewhat difficult in the present study to
evaluate the possible role of oddness. As the reviewer notes, however, a future study might
make use of a three-valued task such as the one presented in Katsos and Bishop (2011), which
might reveal more fine-grained differences in types of ‘rejection’.
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To sum up, the results of this study reveal that children successfully de-
rive distributive and conjunctive inferences, which are both scalar inferences
derived from non-replacement alternatives. This finding contrasts with previ-
ous findings showing that children struggle to derive scalar inferences involving
alternatives generated through lexical replacement (e.g., Noveck 2001, Chierchia
et al. 2001, Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Guasti et al. 2005, Foppolo et al.
2012, among many others). Of course, our results need to be interpreted with
a certain level of caution, as we did not provide a direct comparison of scalar
inferences derived from replacement alternatives and those derived from non-
replacement alternatives. A future study could directly compare the derivation
of non-replacement inferences (e.g., distributive/conjunctive inferences) and in-
ferences based on lexical replacement. This would provide a more explicit test
of the prediction that children will be uniquely successful in deriving scalar
inferences from non-replacement alternatives.
3.1 Quantifier spreading
An anonymous reviewer noted that the response pattern we associated with
‘conjunctive responders’ (i.e. children who rejected target sentences in both
the Distributive and the Non-Distributive conditions) might also be at-
tributable to a well-known phenomenon called ‘quantifier spreading’ (Philip
1991, 1995). This is a phenomenon whereby children are observed to reject
sentence descriptions headed by a universal quantifier in situations where there
are ‘leftover’ objects that are not matched with an agent. For example, Philip
(1995) found that children would often reject a sentence like (31) if it were used
to describe a context in which every man was riding a donkey, but there was a
donkey that was not being ridden.
(31) Every man is riding a donkey.
In both test conditions in our experiment, there were objects/animals (e.g.,
butterflies) that were not matched with an agent. Therefore, as the anonymous
reviewer notes, if children accessed a quantifier spreading interpretation, they
would be expected to reject the target sentence in both test conditions. While we
are not able to completely rule out the possibility that these children’s responses
were based on a quantifier spreading interpretation, we believe it is implausible
for the following reasons.
First, the justifications provided by the relevant children are not in line with
what would be expected if they were accessing a quantifier spreading inter-
pretation. If children accessed such an interpretation, we would expect their
justifications to focus on the leftover objects, and the fact that they were not
being acted upon. However, as we identified in Section 2.2, the justifications
of the children providing a ‘conjunctive response’ tended to focus on the items
that the characters had acted upon (e.g., two have big teas, and one got a little
tea; see also Appendix E for the complete list of justifications given by children
who gave no-responses).
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Second, a study by Sugisaki and Isobe (2001) found that when there was
more than one ‘leftover’ object in the context, children’s quantifier spreading
interpretations reduced from 62.5% to 12.5% (see also Rakhlin 2007 for similar
discussion). In our experimental conditions, there were always three leftover
objects. Given Sugisaki and Isobe (2001)’s findings, it is unlikely that many
(if any) of our child participant’s responses were based on having accessed a
quantifier spreading interpretation.
In sum, we believe that it is unlikely that the children’s conjunctive response
patterns were based on having accessed a quantifier spreading interpretation.
3.2 The egalitarian interpretation
Two of the child participants (who were included in the general data analysis
but excluded from the individual categorisation) provided a response pattern
that was not expected on any of the readings we identified. Instead, these par-
ticipants appeared to access what might be called an egalitarian interpretation
of the target sentences, meaning they would only accept the target sentence if
each character had acted upon the same kind of object. That is, these two chil-
dren rejected the target sentences in the Distributive condition and accepted
them in the Non-Distributive condition. The justifications these child partic-
ipants offered for rejecting the target sentences in the Distributive condition
indicated that they accepted the target sentences only if all of the characters
performed the same action, e.g., (No, because) only one got a small butterfly ;
(No, because) one drank a small tea, two drank a big tea.
A similar pattern of responses was previously reported in a study by Boster
and Crain (1993) and in a study by Kiguchi and Thornton (2016). Boster
et al. tested 4-year-old children using sentences with disjunction, which were
embedded under the universal quantifier, every, as in the present study. The
authors of both studies report that a subset of their child participants accepted
the test sentences only if all of the relevant characters performed the same
action. Boster et al. proposed that across languages, children initially adopt this
egalitarian interpretation to ensure that other interpretations can be acquired
on the basis of positive evidence. This proposal is based on the observation
that the egalitarian interpretation makes sentences true in a narrow range of
circumstances, making it the ‘subset’ interpretation. Speakers of a number
of languages judge sentences to be true in circumstances corresponding to the
egalitarian interpretation (e.g., Mandarin Chinese (An 2015)).
We should note that, while striking, the presence of this response pattern
does not bear directly on the interpretations we have attached to the other re-
sponse patterns produced by participants. That is, the egalitarian interpretation
appears to be a distinct interpretation, unrelated to the target inferences.
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4 Conclusion
Recent developmental work has led to proposals that children’s variable success
in computing scalar inferences can be explained by appealing to the nature of the
alternatives involved; we refer to this family of approaches as the Alternatives-
based approach. This approach was the source of the specific prediction we
investigated — namely that adults and children would derive scalar inferences
based on non-replacement alternatives to a similar extent. To test this predic-
tion, we used sentences in which disjunction was embedded under a universal
quantifier, e.g., every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly. Such
sentences give rise to the distributive inference that some elephants caught a big
butterfly and some elephants caught a small butterfly, and for children also to
the conjunctive inference that every elephant caught a big butterfly and a small
butterfly. Crucially, these inferences can be derived using non-replacement al-
ternatives that can be formulated by simplifying the asserted sentence through
deletion; as such, they do not rely on lexical replacement of alternatives. The
findings of the present study reveal that children derive these scalar inferences at
an adult-like rate. This result is in line with the predictions of the Alternatives-
based approach, and provide support for it as a viable explanation of children’s
variable success in computing scalar inferences.
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Appendix: Deriving the distributive and conjunc-
tive inferences
In this appendix, we sketch a possible derivation of scalar inferences like the
exclusivity inference (33), from the asserted sentence (32). Following this we
will outline how the distributive inference and the conjunctive inference can be
accounted for through this same scalar inference process.
(32) The elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
(33) It’s not the case that the elephant caught both a big butterfly and a
small butterfly.
As mentioned, there is ongoing debate regarding the exact mechanism un-
derlying scalar inferences. The main contribution of our study does not hinge
on assuming any one particular account, but for the purposes of illustration, we
will adopt a grammatical account of scalar implicatures (Chierchia 2006, Fox
2007). We will first sketch the main ingredients of this account and then show
how it can derive the three inferences in turn.
A Deriving the exclusivity inference
The gist of the grammatical account is that scalar implicatures arise due to the
presence of a covert exhaustivity operator exh, akin to ‘only,’ which quantifies
over a sentence and its relevant alternatives. Intuitively, what exh generally does
is strengthen the sentence as much as possible, while avoiding contradictions
and arbitrary choices among the sentence’s alternatives. The definition of exh
is provided in (34), and the definition of the alternatives that can be negated,
the ‘excludable’ alternatives, is provided in (35). In essence, exh takes a sentence
and a set of alternatives as its input and outputs the conjunction of that sentence
and the negation of a subset of its alternatives. An alternative is excludable if
its negation doesn’t contradict the literal meaning of the asserted sentence, and
doesn’t force us to accept any other alternative in the set.15
(34) [[exh φ]](w) = [[φ]](w) ∧ ∀ψ ∈ excl(φ,ALT (φ))[¬[[ψ]](w)]
(35) excl(φ,X) =
{ψ ∈ X : [[φ]] * [[ψ]] ∧ ¬∃χ[χ ∈ X ∧ ([[φ]] ∧ ¬[[ψ]]) ⊆ [[χ]]]}
15This is what Fox (2007) refers to as ‘innocent exclusion.’ Fox (2007) further refines the
version above, but it will suffice for our purposes; see Fox (2007) for discussion.
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In the following, we turn to show how the ingredients above can derive
the exclusivity inference, and, subsequently, the distributive and conjunctive
inferences. Let us return to the sentence in (36) and its inference, schematised
as ‘(a ∨ b)’.
(36) The elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
 The elephant didn’t catch both a big and a small butterfly
The exclusivity inference is derived by assuming that exh is now underly-
ingly present in the sentence above as in (38) and that it quantifies over the
alternatives in (37).16
(37) Alt =
{
a ∨ b,a,b,a ∧ b }
(38) exh[a ∨ b] = (a ∨ b) ∧ ¬(a ∧ b)
As is easy to see, only the conjunctive alternative is excludable in this case,
and the meaning obtained is the desired exclusivity inference ¬(a ∧ b), i.e. the
elephant didn’t catch both a big and a small butterfly.17
B Deriving the distributive inference
In this subsection, we show that the ingredients above applied to a sentence like
(39), schematised as ‘everyx(Ax ∨ Bx)’, can derive the distributive inference
as well.
(39) Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
 Some elephant caught a big butterfly and some elephant caught a small
butterfly
We are assuming the set of alternatives in (40); the derivation is provided
in (41). The crucial bit of the outcome that corresponds to the distributive
inference is the negation of the alternatives corresponding to the disjuncts: every
elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly, and not every elephant
caught a big butterfly and not every elephant caught a small butterfly, therefore
it must be that some elephants caught a big butterfly and some elephants caught
a small one.
(40) Alt =

everyx(Ax ∨Bx),
everyx(Ax),
everyx(Bx),
everyx(Ax ∧Bx)

16A key question for the grammatical account and for approaches to scalar implicatures
in general, is how to determine the alternatives, which exh quantifies over. This is a very
controversial topic in literature, which goes well beyond the scope of this paper. We will
simply assume the alternatives that we need for the derivations below; see Breheny et al.
(2016) and references therein for discussion.
17Notice that if we were to try and also exclude the single disjuncts, we would either obtain
a contradiction with the assertion (by excluding both), or we would have to arbitrarily choose
one of the two, and this is precisely what exh is designed not to do.
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(41) exh[everyx(Ax ∨Bx)] =
everyx(Ax∨Bx)∧¬everyx(Ax)∧¬everyx(Bx)∧¬everyx(Ax∧Bx) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ somex(Ax) ∧ somex(Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax ∧Bx)
In this way, it is possible for the distributive inference to be analysed as a scalar
inference, derived as above.18
C Deriving the conjunctive inference
We turn now to outline how the conjunctive inference can be derived as a scalar
inference, from an asserted sentence like (42).
(42) Every elephant caught a big butterfly or a small butterfly.
 Every elephant caught a big butterfly and a small butterfly
There are three things that we need to mention in this respect. First, in
order to derive the conjunctive inference from a sentence like (42) via the scalar
inference process, we need to compute the process at an embedded level. This
is natural in the grammatical account we have been using above, where exh
can appear embedded within a sentence. Second, it needs to be assumed that
the scalar inference process can be applied recursively, again something that is
natural in this account, by simply assuming more than one exh in the sentence.
Finally, it needs to be assumed that, unlike adults, children do not generate
the conjunctive alternative for a disjunctive sentence.19 In fact, this is why the
conjunctive inference is proposed to be a possible inference of disjunction only
for children; if the conjunctive alternative were available, like it is assumed to
be for adults, the conjunctive inference derivation would be blocked.20 Singh
et al. (2016) justify this assumption by proposing that children are limited
in their generation of alternative sentences (along the lines proposed by the
Alternatives-based approach); in particular, children are proposed to experience
difficulties generating alternative sentences involving lexical replacement, such
as the conjunctive alternative.
The derivation is as follows: We assume that (42) is analysed as in (44),
where not one but two exh appear in the scope of the quantifier.21
(44) everyx(exh1(exh2(Ax ∨Bx)))
18As mentioned in fn.9, Crnicˇ et al. (2015) argue against deriving the distributive inference
through this traditional scalar inference process. Their derivation is the same with respect
to the nature of the alternative sentences. We therefore do not go into the details of their
proposal here, however see Appendix D for the derivation they use.
19See Singh et al. (2016) for further discussion of this point.
20See Davidson (2013) and Bowler (2014) for evidence of conjunctive inferences of disjunc-
tion in adults in American Sign Language and Warlpiri.
21More precisely, we would need to assume an underlying logical form along the lines of
(43):
(43) everyx(elephant(x))(λx[exh1(exh2(Ax ∨Bx))])
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We are assuming that the alternatives for exh2 are those in (45), not includ-
ing the conjunctive alternative, as mentioned above. As is easy to see, exh2
doesn’t add anything to the sentence directly, as none of the alternatives in
(45) is excludable. However, it plays a crucial indirect role by exhaustifying
the alternatives for exh1, which are those in (46). When exh1 quantifies over
these latter alternatives, the two alternatives corresponding to the two exhaus-
tified disjuncts are excludable, so they end up being negated. Their negation, in
conjunction with the assertion, gives rise to the conjunctive meaning shown in
(47). When this meaning is composed with the rest of the sentence, we obtain
(48), which corresponds to the desired conjunctive inference above that every
elephant caught a big and a small butterfly.
(45) Alt2 =
{
(Ax ∨Bx),Ax,Bx }
(46) Alt1 =
 exh2(Ax ∨Bx) = (Ax ∨Bx)exh2(Ax) = (Ax ∧ ¬Bx)
exh2(Bx) = (Bx ∧ ¬Ax)

(47) exh1(exh2(Ax ∨Bx)) =
(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬(Ax ∧ ¬Bx) ∧ ¬(Bx ∧ ¬Ax) =
(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ (Ax→ Bx) ∧ (Bx→ Ax) =
(Ax ∧Bx)
(48) everyx(Ax ∧Bx)
D No other inference explains the results
In this appendix, we investigate a variety of possible parses for sentences of
the form ‘everyx(Ax ∨Bx)’ involving one or more exh at different scope sites.
We show that none of them are associated with an inference other than the
conjunctive and distributive inferences, hence the pattern observed in our study
(see also Singh et al. 2016 for analogous derivations). In essence, all of the
parses explored below result either in the distributive inference, the conjunctive
inference, no inference at all, or the two exclusivity inferences in (49) and (50).
(49) ¬everyx(Ax ∧Bx)
(50) everyx¬(Ax ∧Bx)
All of our target conditions were designed to be compatible with both of these
inferences i.e. these inferences were always true in the test conditions, so they
cannot account for the pattern of rejections we observed. We therefore conclude
that the conjunctive and distributive inferences are what most plausibly drove
the behavior displayed by our adult and child participants.
In the following, we sketch the derivations of the various parses in detail. We
do this in two steps: we first consider scenarios where children cannot access the
lexical conjunctive alternative, following the Alternatives-based approach (and
Singh et al. 2016), and we then consider derivations that are possible when the
conjunctive alternative is assumed to be available.
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D.1 Parses based on non-replacement alternatives
Let us return to a sentence of the form ‘everyx(Ax∨Bx)’ and explore a variety
of parses with exh at different sites, by keeping, for now, the assumption that
children can only access non-replacement alternatives.
• With only one exh at the global level, we derive the distributive inferences
(as already demonstrated in Appendix B).
(51) exh(everyx(Ax ∨Bx)) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax) ∧ ¬everyx(Bx) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ somex(Ax) ∧ somex(Bx)
(52) Alt =
 everyx(Ax ∨Bx)everyx(Ax)
everyx(Bx)

• Having two global exh’s lead again to the distributive inferences, i.e. the
second exh does not add anything.
(53) exh2(exh1(everyx(Ax ∨Bx))) =
everyx(Ax∨Bx)∧¬everyx(Ax)∧¬everyx(Bx)∧¬(everyx(Ax)∧
¬everyx(Bx)) ∧ ¬(everyx(Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax)) =
everyx(Ax∨Bx)∧¬everyx(Ax)∧¬everyx(Bx)∧everyx(Ax)↔
everyx(Bx) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax) ∧ ¬everyx(Bx)
(54) Alt1 =
 everyx(Ax ∨Bx),everyx(Ax),
everyx(Bx)

(55) Alt2 =
 exh1(everyx(Ax ∨Bx)) = everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax) ∧ ¬everyx(Bx),exh1(everyx(Ax)) = everyx(Ax) ∧ ¬everyx(Bx),
exh1(everyx(Bx)) = everyx(Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax),

• Having one local exh leads to no inference at all, as no alternative is
excludable.
(56) everyx[exh[Ax ∨Bx]] = everyx[Ax ∨Bx]
(57) Alt = {(Ax ∨Bx), Ax,Bx}
• Having two local exh’s leads us to the conjunctive inference (as demon-
strated in Appendix C).
(58) everyx[exh2[exh1[Ax ∨Bx]]] =
everyx[(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ (Ax↔ Bx)] =
everyx[Ax ∧Bx]
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(59) Alt1 = {(Ax ∨Bx), Ax,Bx}
(60) Alt2 = {(Ax ∨Bx), Ax ∧ ¬Bx,Bx ∧ ¬Ax}
• With one local exh and one global exh, we derive the distributive inferences
(this is analogous to the derivation proposed by Crnicˇ et al. (2015) for
distributive inferences in adults).
(61) exh2(everyx(exh1[Ax ∨Bx])) =
everyx(Ax∨Bx)∧¬(everyx(Ax∧¬Bx))∧¬(everyx(Ax∧¬Bx)) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ somex(Ax) ∧ somex(Bx)
(62) Alt1 = {Ax ∨Bx,Ax,Bx}
(63) Alt2 =
 everyx(exh[Ax ∨Bx]) = everyx(Ax ∨Bx)everyx(exh(Ax)) = everyx(Ax ∧ ¬Bx)
everyx(exh(Bx)) = everyx(Bx ∧ ¬Ax)

In sum, we have shown that all plausible parses based on non-replacement
alternatives either lead to the distributive or the conjunctive inference or no in-
ference at all. We next consider possible parses when the conjunctive alternative
is assumed to be available. The outcome is analogous: the resulting parses are
associated with either the distributive inference or one of the two inferences in
(49) and (50), neither of which, as we have previously mentioned, can account
for our results.
D.2 Parses based on availability of all alternatives
We describe the parses below and how they relate to our results.
• With only one exh at the global level, we once again derive the distributive
inferences. The negation of the conjunctive alternative, corresponding to
(49) above, is already entailed by the negation of the other two alterna-
tives. The derivation is therefore the same as above.
(64) exh(everyx(Ax ∨Bx)) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬everyx(Ax) ∧ ¬everyx(Bx) =
everyx(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ somex(Ax) ∧ somex(Bx)
(65) Alt =

everyx(Ax ∨Bx)
everyx(Ax)
everyx(Bx)
everyx(Ax ∧Bx)

• Having two global exh’s leads again to the distributive inferences. It is
straightforward to show that the second exh does not add anything, re-
gardless of the presence of the conjunctive alternative. We therefore do
not repeat the derivation here.
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• Having one local exh leads to the inference in (50), given that the con-
junctive alternative is locally excludable.
(66) everyx[exh[Ax ∨Bx]] = everyx[(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬(Ax ∧Bx)]
(67) Alt = {(Ax ∨Bx), Ax,Bx, (Ax ∧Bx)}
• Having two local exh’s results in the same inference in (50), as the second
exh does not add anything. This is because the conjunctive alternative
makes it so that the alternatives corresponding to each disjunct are non-
excludable in the second round of exhaustification.
(68) everyx[exh2[exh1[Ax ∨Bx]]] =
everyx[(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬(Ax ∧Bx)]
(69) Alt1 = {(Ax ∨Bx), Ax,Bx, (Ax ∧Bx)}
(70) Alt2 = {((Ax∨Bx)∧¬(Ax∧Bx)), Ax∧¬Bx,Bx∧¬Ax, (Ax∧Bx)}
• Having one local exh and one global exh also leads to the same inference.
This is again because this inference blocks the negation of the alternatives
corresponding to the disjuncts in the second round of exhaustification (see
also Crnicˇ et al. 2015 for discussion).
(71) exh2(everyx(exh1[Ax ∨Bx])) =
everyx[(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬(Ax ∧Bx)]
(72) Alt1 = {Ax ∨Bx,Ax,Bx,Ax ∧Bx}
(73) Alt2 =

everyx(exh[Ax ∨Bx]) = everyx[(Ax ∨Bx) ∧ ¬(Ax ∧Bx)]
everyx(exh(Ax)) = everyx(Ax ∧ ¬Bx)
everyx(exh(Bx)) = everyx(Bx ∧ ¬Ax)
everyx(exh(Ax ∧Bx)) = everyx(Ax ∧Bx)

In sum, whether or not the conjunctive alternative is assumed to be available,
no plausible inferences other than the distributive and conjunctive inferences can
explain the observed pattern of results.
Appendix E: Children’s justifications for no-responses
In this Appendix, we report the justifications that children gave for providing
no-responses, for both the distributive and non-distributive conditions.
ID Condition Justification
Child1 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Everyone opened a big can. Her said everyone
opened a big one and a small one.
Child1 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Everyone drinked a big juice.
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Child1 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Everyone ate a big cookie only.
Child1 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Everyone did a big dish, not a small dish too.
Child1 DISTRIBUTIVE One got a little butterfly, and two more have
the big butterflies.
Child1 DISTRIBUTIVE Two have big teas, and one got a little tea.
Child1 DISTRIBUTIVE Two girls have a big pizza, and one got a little
pizza.
Child1 DISTRIBUTIVE One ride a little car, and two ride the big cars.
Child2 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They opened a big can.
Child2 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of the mouse drank a big juice.
Child2 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They ate a big cookie.
Child2 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They washed a big dish.
Child3 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of the mice drank big juices.
Child3 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of the cows just washed a big dish.
Child3 DISTRIBUTIVE Two caught big butterflies and one caught a lit-
tle butterfly.
Child3 DISTRIBUTIVE Two bought big teas and one bought a little tea.
Child3 DISTRIBUTIVE Two ate big ones and one ate little one.
Child3 DISTRIBUTIVE Two drove big cars and one drove a little car.
Child4 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They got a big can.
Child4 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They got a big juice.
Child4 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They got a big cookie.
Child4 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They did a big dish.
Child5 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They all opened a big can.
Child5 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They only ate a big cookie.
Child5 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Every cow didn’t do little dish.
Child6 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Every cat opened a big one.
Child6 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Everyone drank a big one.
Child6 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Everyone ate a big one.
Child6 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They washed big dish.
Child6 DISTRIBUTIVE One buyed a small one.
Child6 DISTRIBUTIVE One drank a small tea. Two drank big tea.
Child6 DISTRIBUTIVE One girl ate a small one.
Child6 DISTRIBUTIVE One drived a yellow, small car.
Child7 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They only did the big dishes.
Child8 DISTRIBUTIVE Only one got a small butterfly.
Child8 DISTRIBUTIVE Only one got a small tea.
Child8 DISTRIBUTIVE Only one of them ate a small pizza.
Child8 DISTRIBUTIVE Only one drove a small car.
Child9 DISTRIBUTIVE One caught a small butterfly. Two caught a big
butterfly.
Child9 DISTRIBUTIVE One drank a small tea. Two drank a big tea.
Child9 DISTRIBUTIVE One ate small, two big pizza.
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Child9 DISTRIBUTIVE Two drove a big car and one drove a small car.
Child10 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE The cats all got one big can.
Child10 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of the mice drinked orange juice, lemon juice,
and apple juice.
Child10 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All the fairies have a big cookie.
Child10 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All the cows have washed one big dish.
Child11 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They only opened a big can.
Child11 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They all drank a big juice.
Child11 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE The ate all a big cookie.
Child11 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They all did wash a big dish.
Child12 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Every cat opened a big can.
Child12 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Every mice have a big juice.
Child12 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All the fairies ate a big cookie.
Child12 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Every cow washed a big dish.
Child13 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of them opened the big ones.
Child13 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of them drank the big ones.
Child13 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of them had the big one.
Child13 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All wanted the big ones.
Child13 DISTRIBUTIVE Because the first one said the big ones and the
other one said the little one.
Child13 DISTRIBUTIVE Because the first one said the little one, and the
others said the big ones.
Child13 DISTRIBUTIVE Because the two girls said the big pizza and one
said the small one.
Child13 DISTRIBUTIVE The first one said I want to drive a big car, and
the other one said big car, and the other one
said small car.
Child14 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE They drank big ones.
Child15 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Because all the cats opened a big can.
Child15 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Because all the mouse drank a big juice.
Child15 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE Because all the fairies ate a big one.
Child15 NON-DISTRIBUTIVE All of the cows washed a big dish.
Child15 DISTRIBUTIVE Because two dogs drove a big car and one dog
drove a little car.
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